The Effects of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Case Law on the Development of Hungarian Law by Szabó, Marcel
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 56, No 1, pp. 59–71 (2015)
DOI: 10.1556/026.2015.56.1.6
1216-2574 / USD 20.00
© 2015 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
The Effects of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Strasbourg Case Law 
on the Development of Hungarian Law 
BY MARCEL SZABÓ*
Abstract. The European Convention on Human Rights is a milestone in the development of international law, 
aimed at guarding fundamental freedoms and human rights in Europe. As a consequence of the unique path of 
Central and Eastern European legal development, the provisions of the Convention and the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights were not necessarily implemented into Hungarian law through the jurisprudence 
of Hungarian courts, but it was much rather the Constitutional Court who facilitated such implementation. 
Although the human rights protection system shaped by the European Court of Human Rights has now become an 
integral part of Hungarian law, the effect of the Convention and the Strasbourg case law on the Hungarian legal 
development is still rather meagre. The present article seeks to explore the possible reasons for this development.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been twenty years since the most important constitutional document of the European 
human rights protection, namely the European Convention on Human Rights1 (“the 
Convention”) was promulgated by Act XXXI of 1993 entering into force on 15 April 1993 
in Hungary.2 The Council of Europe was established with the aim to ensure European unity 
and to discover the common values which could serve as a sound basis for the cooperation 
between European peoples. The Council of Europe has contributed greatly toward 
unearthing the common values, establishing the foundation and the protection of such 
values.
Hungary signed the Convention on 6 November 1990 shortly after the fi rst free 
elections took place and deposited the confi rmation document on 5 November 1992. The 
Hungarian membership to the Convention commenced with a minor diffi culty, the 
Convention only came into effect with respect to Hungary after six months following the 
deposit of the confi rmation document. The Hungarian Constitutional Court referred to the 
1 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
2 Pál Sonnevend, ‘The Position of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Hungarian 
Legal Order’ in Enver Hasani, Peter Paczolay and Michael Riegner (eds), Constitutional Justice in 
Southeast Europe: Constitutional Courts in Kosovo, Serbia, Albania and Hungary between Ordinary 
Judiciaries and the European Court of Human Rights (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 2012) 166.
*Ombudsman for future generations, Offi ce of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, Hungary.
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Convention several times before 19933 and in the same year, prior to the accession to the 
Convention, the Constitutional Court specifi cally referred to the judgements of the 
Strasbourg European Court of Human Rights.4 At that time this “was a mere demonstration 
of exploring European standards”, as László Sólyom, the former president of Hungary 
pointed out.5
The Council of Europe and the Court were the torch-bearers of human rights in Europe 
at a time when Hungary suffered decades of Soviet oppression. Consequently, the Council 
of Europe represented the values that could not be enforced in Hungary between 1950 and 
1990 for reasons of the dictatorial political system. This fuelled the expectation that the 
Hungarian legislation and jurisprudence will enthusiastically identify with the values and 
accept the human rights protection system shaped by the Court in the course of the previous 
decades. Ultimately it seems that the effect of the Court and the Convention on the 
Hungarian development of law is rather meagre. In the following sections I intend to 
explore the possible reasons for this development. 
1. THE NORMS OF STRASBOURG EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION
We must draw a distinction between different legal categories when analysing the effects of 
the Convention and the Strasbourg case law on the Hungarian development of law: 
1.1. European Convention on Human Rights
As the Convention has become part of Hungarian domestic law, the provisions of the 
Convention are binding on all Hungarian legal entities. Before the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary entered into force in 2012 the previous Hungarian constitution merely prescribed 
the consistency between international law and domestic law as a constitutional criterion.6 
The priority of international agreements over Hungarian legislation could be deduced from 
the provisions of the Constitutional Court Act according to which the Constitutional Court 
had the right to annul acts contravening international agreements.7 By comparison, the new 
Fundamental Law of Hungary accommodates public international law by clarifying that 
3 The Constitutional Court referred to the European Convention on Human Rights for the fi rst 
time in its Decision No. 23/1990 (X. 31.) (ABH 1990, 88.) in 1990, one week before the signing of 
the Convention.
4 The Hungarian Constitutional Court declared in its Decision No. 64/1993 (XII. 22.) (ABH 
1993, 379–382) that its interpretation on the protection of property is in accordance with the provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights. See László Sólyom, Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon [The Beginnings of 
Constitutional Jurisdiction in Hungary] (Osiris 2001) 640.
5 László Sólyom, ‘Kölcsönhatás az Emberi Jogok Európai Bíróságának esetjoga és a 
szólásszabadság védelme között Magyarországon’ [Interaction between the Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of the Freedom of Speech in Hungary] (1996) 
97/3–4 Állam- és Jogtudomány 151.
6 See Article 7 paragraph 1 of Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic.
7 See Article 42 paragraph 1 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (previously Article 
45 of Act XXXII of 1989).
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promulgated international agreements enjoy priority over domestic Hungarian laws and 
other legal instruments.8 
According to the Constitutional Court in case of confl ict the Constitution shall prevail9 
over the international agreements.10 As Peter Kovács also underlines in respect of the 
hierarchy of norms, the Convention in the Hungarian constitutional legal order is 
subordinated to the constitution, however, it enjoys a higher position in comparison to 
domestic laws and other legal instruments.11 Naturally, this concept was applicable to the 
period prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law. Article 7 paragraph 1 of the 
former Constitution set out the requirement of consistency between international and 
domestic law. The Constitutional Court ensured compliance with this constitutional 
requirement by interpreting the provisions of the Constitution in accordance with the rules 
of international law,12 but it could not annul the provisions of the Constitution.13 Péter 
Kovács believes that the rules of the Convention are quasi equivalent to the fundamental 
provisions of Fundamental Law and pursuant to the imperative logic and expedience of the 
Convention he emphasizes that the respective rules of the Fundamental Law should be 
interpreted in light of the Strasbourg case law.14 In case consistency cannot be ensured 
between international obligations and the Fundamental Law, the legislator is responsible for 
ensuring this harmony even through the amendment15 of the Fundamental Law.16
1.2. Cases to which Hungary was a party 
As a signatory to the Convention, Hungary is obliged to enforce judgments to which 
Hungary is a party. The vast majority of the judgments declare that the domestic legal act or 
procedure under scrutiny is contrary to the human rights norms applied in Strasbourg, 
moreover, as a specifi c obligation the judgment also prescribes the payment of damages to 
the injured private party. The Court in Strasbourg has no formal power to legally oblige 
Hungary to amend domestic law. The primary aim of the states concerned shall be the 
8 See Article Q paragraph 3 of the Fundamental Law.
9 Péter Kovács stresses that the norms of jus cogens prevail over the rules of the Constitution. 
Péter Kovács, ‘La collision d’une norme constitutionnelle et du droit international dans la pratique de 
la Cour Constitutionnelle hongroise’ (2010) 7/1 Miskolc Journal of International Law 19.
10 This perspective may have been motivated by the approach that in the process of the 
conclusion of international agreements there are several possible means to amend the Constitution, 
even by a mandate which does not achieve the degree of constitutional majority. Constitutional 
Decision No. 30/1998 (VI.25.) on the Europe Agreement declares that the Constitution cannot be 
amended by the conclusion of an international agreement.
11 Kovács 16.
12 Constitutional Decision No. 53/1993 (X.13.) ABH 1993, 327. Gábor Magyar also emphasizes 
that the text of the Constitution in force should be analysed and interpreted in the light of the 
Strasbourg case law. Furthermore, he adds that the Constitutional Court only has the right to determine 
a constitutional requirement if the international agreement and the Fundamental Law are inconsistent. 
Gábor Magyar, ‘Strasbourg és a magyar joggyakorlat’ [Strasbourg and the Hungarian Jurisprudence] 
(2005) 1 Fundamentum 51.
13 Constitutional Decision No. 23/1994 (IV. 29.) ABH 1994, 375, 376; Constitutional Decision 
No. 293/B/1994 ABH 1994, 862.
14 Kovács 20.
15 Constitutional Decision No. 4/1997 (I.22.) ABH 1997, 52.
16 Kovács 18.
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prevention of further infringements by amending their relevant domestic law. Several states, 
particularly Italy,17 illustrate well that in the face of multitudinous claims concerning 
identical infringements, the state is forced to amend its laws that infringe human rights.18 
Hungary in cooperation with some other states hampered the amendment to the 
procedural rules of the Court which would have allowed the Court to act as a quasi 
constitutional court and to expand the focus of the judgment from the concrete individual 
case to a more general one, with the result that the Court could have had the right to reject 
cases it deems less signifi cant.19 This solution was found unacceptable by Hungary and 
some other states, since it may jeopardize the effectiveness of the international system of 
legal protection. Consequently, the enforcement of the Court’s judgments in the national 
legal system is of particular relevance to us in accordance with the compromise solution set 
out in Protocol 14, stressing the responsibility of the member states in guaranteeing human 
rights through the national system of legal protection.20
1.3.  Legal Principles Developed in the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights 
It is uncommon in international legal literature to refer to legal principles developed by the 
Court without referring to the judgments. It must be pointed out that with Hungary’s 
accession to the European Union, Hungary became the member of two communities of 
values, both concurrently imposing legal obligations on the state. Hungary is not only a 
member of the Council of Europe but is also a member state of the European Union. In the 
framework of European law the legal principles developed by the Court are considered 
primary law sources. In this respect, the legal principles developed by the Court have 
priority over domestic law pursuant to the hierarchy of norms of the European Union and 
the binding application of such principles is required by the European Union of all judicial 
forums and executive bodies. 
At this point it is worth mentioning that the principles developed by the Court in 
Strasbourg also constitute the general principles of the European Union, therefore, following 
Hungary’s accession to the European Union we are obliged to apply and enforce such 
principles in our national legal order. In my opinion, the mandatory effect of the general 
principles developed in the Strasbourg case law fl ows from the legal force attached to it by 
European law.
17 The European Court of Justice in its judgement in the Sejdovic v. Italy case declared that the 
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure raises systemic problems connected to the malfunctioning of 
domestic legislation as it fails to ensure the possibility to reopen proceedings conducted in the 
accused’s absence, irrespective of the fact that the accused has been properly informed about the 
proceedings. ECtHR: Sejdovic v. Italy (Application no. 56581/00) Strasbourg, Judgment of 1 March 
2006 para. 5.
18 Csaba Pákozdy, ‘The Relation between the Judgements of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the National Law in Hungary’ (2006) 3/3 Miskolc Journal of International Law 85.
19 Mónika Weller, ‘Az európai emberi jogi rendszer reformja: egy új elfogadhatósági kritérium’ 
[The Reform of the European Human Rights System: A New Acceptance Criteria] (2004) 4 Acta 
Humana 88.
20 ibid 61.
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1.4. Judgements of the European Court of Human Rights concerning other Member States 
The provisions of the Convention were unfolded by the Court in its numerous judgments, 
resulting in a comprehensive system of human rights protection. As regards the legal 
position of these judgments in the Hungarian domestic order, different approaches exist.21 
According to one approach the practice of the Court is constantly evolving, thus, it should 
not be continuously compared to the Hungarian domestic legal order. Accordingly, the case 
law of the Court should merely serve as a complementary method substantiating the best 
alternative among the possible solutions provided for under the domestic law.22 Nevertheless, 
we may also assume that by becoming a signatory to the Convention, Hungary became a 
member of a community of law and through its judgments the Court constantly shapes the 
rules of this legal community. Therefore, Hungary shall consider these judgements as 
precedents and standards.23 According to Tamás Bán, the correct interpretation and 
application of the case law may only be achieved if we deduct the conclusions of certain 
judgments and apply them to our own legal system, even if Hungary was not party to the 
procedure. According to Bán this follows from the principle of pacta sunt servanda and the 
principle of performing international obligations in good faith.24 Pursuant to Article 1 of the 
Convention, the contracting parties shall provide each individual under their respective 
jurisdiction the enjoyment of rights and freedoms determined under the Convention, 
furthermore, these rights must be afforded the interpretation refl ected in the decisions of the 
Court.25 Strasbourg case law thus unfolds the specifi c content of the rights, deducting 
possible restrictions of fundamental rights as well as the respective tests from the text of the 
Convention.26 As a result, we must also follow judgments to which we are not a party. This 
follows from Article 46 paragraph 1 of the Convention according to which the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the fi nal judgment of the Court in any case to 
which they are parties. The other important provision is Article 32 paragraph 1 according to 
which the jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation 
and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto.27 
21 Some authors state that the case law of the Court may serve only as a source of inspiration 
while according to others the Court’s case law has a binding effect. See Sonnevend 169–170.
22 For instance, László Blutman stresses that the Court’s reasoning may serve as a justifi catory 
or complementary constitutive argument but should not be a decisive constitutive argument, since 
according to Article 46 of the Convention the judgements of the Court do not have formal normative 
power. In its decision No. 18/2004 (V. 25.) the Constitutional Court declared that the approach of the 
Court constructs and obliges the Hungarian legal practice. László Blutman emphasises that this is not 
applied to certain judgements but rather to the concept itself, namely to the Strasbourg case law in a 
broader sense. See László Blutman, ‘A nemzetközi jog használata az Alkotmány értelmezésénél’ 
[The Use of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation] (2009) 64/7–8 Jogtudományi Közlöny 
308–310.
23 Christoph Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention (2nd edn, Beck 2005) 98.
24 Tamás Bán, ‘Strasbourg és a magyar joggyakorlat’ [Strasbourg and the Hungarian 
Jurisprudence] (2005) 1 Fundamentum 49.
25 Zoltán Tallódi, ‘Strasbourg és a magyar joggyakorlat’ [Strasbourg and the Hungarian 
Jurisprudence] (2005) 1 Fundamentum 55.
26 Bán (2005) 48.
27 ibid 47.
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It is worth highlighting the Fratanoló case28 from among the many judgements of the 
Court rendered in relation to Hungary – a case that gave rise to grave concerns in our 
country, many believe that the Court did not take into account the unique process of legal 
development that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, including the resentment 
towards the use of red star. Some scholars stressed that in the Rekvényi case,29 which was 
one of the most important Strasbourg judgments from the perspective of Hungary, the Court 
gave due consideration to the demand arising in Central and Eastern European states that 
policemen who were actively involved in sustaining the totalitarian, one-party state, should 
not be allowed to continue their activities in political parties.30 The shockwaves of the 
Fratanoló case reached the Hungarian Parliament, which adopted a resolution protesting 
against the fi nal judgement, at the same time, it was clear that Hungary would enforce the 
judgment. Although the case received signifi cant media coverage, what is more important is 
that the Hungarian Parliament has already passed the amendment to the relevant domestic 
law to ensure conformity with the judgment of the Court. 
The Hungarian Parliament is committed to taking into consideration the developments 
in the Strasbourg jurisprudence even in cases that fail to awaken citizens’ interest. The 
provisions of our previous Constitution and our current Fundamental Law with respect to 
the voting rights of the prisoners could serve as a good example. Our Fundamental Law 
may have been decisively infl uenced by the judgement of the European Court of Justice 
rendered in the Hirst case,31 according to which not all persons sentenced to imprisonment 
are excluded from voting,32 but only those who had been excluded from involvement in 
public affairs by fi nal judgment of the domestic court.33
1.5. Recommendations of the Council of Europe 
The Council of Europe adopts recommendations in respect of the specifi c rights protected 
under the Convention and these recommendations may be understood as interpretations and 
detailed clarifi cations of the Convention. According to some authors, Hungary should 
consider these recommendations as soft law norms making up the foundation of the 
European system of human rights protection, since they may underpin the argumentation of 
the Constitutional Court34 or serve the reasonable justifi cation of the judgements. It is 
nevertheless an important question, whether a reference to soft law international documents 
may imply a duty to respect or apply these norms.35 In this regard, László Blutman draws 
28 ECtHR: Fratanoló v. Hungary (Application no. 29459/10) Strasbourg, Judgment of 3 
November 2011.
29 ECtHR: Rekvényi v. Hungary (Application no. 25390/94) Strasbourg, Judgment of 20 May 
1999 [1999] ECHR 31.
30 Tamás Bán, ‘A Rekvényi-ügy és környéke’ [The Rekvényi Case and Its Vicinity] (1999) 3 
Fundamentum 94.
31 ECtHR: Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No 2) (Application no. 74025/01) Strasbourg, Judgment 
of 6 October 2005 [2005] ECHR 681.
32 See Section 5 of Article 70 of Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic.
33 See Section 6 of Article XXIII of the Fundamental Law.
34 See e.g. Constitutional Decision No. 19/1999 (VI.1) (judicial independence), ABH 1999, p. 
150, Section II. 1. 2. 
35 Blutman (2009) 302–304. Cf. Constitutional Decision No. 45/2005 (XII. 14.) (certain rights 
of national and ethnic minorities), ABH 2005, p. 569, Péter Kovács (concurring opinion) Section 
III/2/1.
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attention to the worrisome practice when the Constitutional Court determines the content of 
the rights set out in the Constitution exclusively on the basis of the recommendations issued 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. This means that in the course of 
determining the content of certain constitutional provisions the Constitutional Court invokes 
a non-binding international soft law norm as a constitutive norm.36
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF INVOKING STRASBOURG NORMS
Above, I attempted to draw a distinction between the different Strasbourg norms and other 
complementary instruments of the European system of human rights protection. Below I 
shall explore the institutions and persons entitled to draw attention to discrepancies between 
the Strasbourg case law and domestic law.
2.1. Petitioning the Constitutional Court 
Given that the Convention forms part of the domestic legal order, Hungarian natural and 
legal persons are entitled to claim their rights stemming from the Convention before 
national courts. Persons may also complement their arguments with references to judgments 
unfolded and interpreted in detail by the Court in its jurisprudence, regardless of whether 
Hungary was a party to the proceedings in the framework of which the judgement was 
adopted.
However, Hungarian judicial forums do not have the right to disapply the domestic 
law in case its provisions appear to be contrary to those of the Convention. In such cases, 
the courts shall request the Constitutional Court to assess and adjudge the confl ict of 
norms.37 As such, any reference to the case law of the Court or to the Convention itself shall 
primarily serve the defi nition of the scope and possible restriction of fundamental rights set 
out in the Hungarian Fundamental Law on the basis of the provisions of the Convention 
and case law of the Court. 
2.2. Submissions to the Constitutional Court by lower instance courts
The Hungarian courts may observe ex offi cio and not solely upon the request of a private 
individual that a law is contrary to the case law of the Court or the provisions of the 
Convention. In this case domestic courts may ex offi cio seek remedy from the Constitutional 
Court and request the resolution of the confl ict of norms. 
2.3. Ex offi cio procedure of the Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court is bound by the Fundamental Law and may therefore not annul its 
provisions. However, in case the provisions of the Convention and the Fundamental Law 
are in contravention, the Constitutional Court may call the legislator’s attention to such an 
inconsistency. The Parliament has the authority to resolve the inconsistency observed by the 
36 Blutman (2009) 312.
37 According to Article 32 paragraph 2 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court “[j]udges 
shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Constitutional Court proceedings if, in the course of 
the adjudication of a concrete case, they are bound to apply a legal act that they perceive to be 
contrary to an international treaty.”
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Constitutional Court even by means of amending the Fundamental Law38 since providing 
for harmony with international law constitutes an essential duty of the Parliament prescribed 
by the Fundamental law.39 
2.4.  Preliminary assessment of draft legislations by the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Justice 
It is the duty of governmental representatives working in the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Justice to perform the preliminary assessment of draft legislation in the 
light of the Convention and the Strasbourg case-law and to indicate to the legislator in case 
they arrive at the conclusion that draft legislation is contrary to these sources.40
Based on the above we may state that there are certain institutions and actors in the 
Hungarian legal order that are responsible for ensuring the harmonised, consistent and 
effective implementation of the provision of the Convention and the case law of the Court 
into domestic law, either in the framework of their constitutional duties or their authority of 
enforcement. Below I will examine how relevant procedural rules and legal theory may 
facilitate the effective enforcement carried out by such actors. 
3. NATIONAL FORUMS OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT
3.1. Ordinary courts
As far as the enforcement of Strasbourg human rights principles are concerned, the 
Hungarian judicial system is not part of the solution but much rather a part of the problem, 
at least from the perspective of the citizens. A signifi cant portion of the successful cases 
before the Court are premised on the principle of due process breached by the lengthy 
procedures of domestic courts. The number of claims submitted against Hungary has 
increased year by year, there are more and more well-founded claims and over one quarter 
of admissible actions connected to the breach of Article 6 of the Convention.41 Hungarian 
courts play a minor role in resolving anomalies of the domestic legal system pursuant to the 
principles formed by the Court, for, as pointed out above, domestic courts cannot arrive at a 
contra legem interpretation of Hungarian law. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights of the past decades has helped clarify the content of 
several fundamental rights, therefore, the legal principles developed by the Court or the 
precedents ensuing from the concrete judgments may inspire praeter legem interpretation. 
Hungarian ordinary courts are reluctant to found their decisions on the Fundamental 
Law and its fundamental rights provisions. They merely refer to constitutional principles as 
supplementary arguments and they almost never mention human rights which are set out in 
international treaties.42 As Gábor Magyar highlighted in his research, of all the judgments 
38 See Section 2 of Article 42 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court.
39 See Section 2 of Article Q of the Fundamental Law.
40 Tallódi  56–57.
41 Anikó Szalai, ‘Az Emberi Jogok Európai Bírósága ítélkezésének megjelenése a magyar 
Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában’ [The Emergence of the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the Practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court] (2010) 7/4 Kül-Világ 16.
42 László Blutman, ‘A nemzetközi jog a magyar bírósági joggyakorlatban’ [International Law in 
the Judicial Practice of the Hungarian Courts] in Károly Tóth (ed.), In memoriam Nagy Károly (1932–
2001) (SZTE-ÁJK 2002) 44.
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adopted in the entire domestic judicial system between 1992 and 2004, there were only 4 
judgements where the Convention and the practice of the Court had a major infl uence on 
the fi nal decision.43 Furthermore, we are not aware of any judgement where the local or 
county court presumed a confl ict between Strasbourg law and domestic law, referring the 
case to the Constitutional Court to resolve such confl ict. As such, we may say that the 
contribution of the domestic judicial system to the enforcement of the Convention and the 
related case law of the Court is rather minimal. 
In several European states active citizens have profoundly contributed to the 
implementation of Strasbourg case law into the domestic legal system, supported by the 
judicial forums in the legal enforcement process. According to the typical position of 
domestic courts, the Hungarian legislator is the one responsible for ensuring conformity 
between Strasbourg law and domestic law. National judges restrict themselves to applying 
the provisions of the domestic legal order and expect the legislator to deal with the 
implementation of international rules into the Hungarian law. In this context, Mónika Weller 
draws attention to the signifi cance of acts of the court, since these are considered as 
imputable to the state under international law, capable of giving rise to the international 
liability of the state in case of infringement.44 It is worth mentioning the legal tradition 
characteristic of Central and Eastern Europe, according to which for several decades 
constitutional law – as a quasi legal window dressing – had no veritable connection to 
domestic criminal or civil law, rendering it a heresy for the party to invoke constitutional 
rights before the court. As a result, traditions of human rights protection could only be 
established following the political change. It would be extremely demanding for domestic 
courts to take into consideration judgments in the course of the assessment of cases related 
to fundamental rights which are predominantly unavailable in the Hungarian language and 
which are so complexly framed, that their system is not necessarily accessible for Hungarian 
judges. At the same time, the short summaries of certain judgments available in Hungarian 
are often oversimplifi ed and capable of misleading national judges into drawing false 
analogies. With the extension of the material scope of the Convention and the determination 
of new forms of infringements, the Strasbourg Court is taking a strict stance making it even 
more diffi cult for national courts to continuously follow Strasbourg jurisprudence.45 
Moreover, even the Strasbourg Court fails to precisely follow its own jurisprudence. 
Therefore, the cautious attitude of domestic courts towards the human rights related 
guidance of the European Court of Human Rights is neither unjustifi ed nor to be condemned; 
at the same time, we can only hope that with time, this reserved approach will change.
3.2. Constitutional Court
The implementation of the values developed by the Court was predominantly carried out by 
the Constitutional Court in the domestic context. Government representatives as supporting 
experts also facilitated this mediation process, albeit their work was not accessible to the 
public. In theory, a case concerning the Convention or the practice of the Court may be 
brought before the Constitutional Court in two ways. Firstly, a case may concern the confl ict 
between international law and Hungarian law. According to our international obligations 
and constitutional provisions, the Strasbourg law prevails over the domestic law. Although 
43 Magyar  49.
44 Mónika Weller, ‘Strasbourg és a magyar joggyakorlat’ (2005) 1 Fundamentum 59.
45 Magyar 52.
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it is the Constitutional Court that is entitled46 to assess the confl ict of domestic law and 
international law and is empowered to annul legal acts contrary to national law promulgating 
an international treaty,47 the Act on the Constitutional Court has regulated the scope of 
persons entitled to launch such proceedings so restrictively48 that it is almost impossible to 
bring a case before the Constitutional Court via this route. 
The Strasbourg law may further become the subject of consideration by the 
Constitutional Court in the case where this major judicial forum seeks international 
examples and inspirations for the clarifi cation of the framework of domestic constitutional 
norms. Although the Fundamental Law was inspired predominantly by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,49 
taking into account the universal nature of human rights a signifi cant number of the 
aforementioned international treaties’ provisions are also enshrined in the Convention. 
Moreover, the remarkably productive jurisprudence of the Court enabled the domestic 
development of several principles and solutions. If the Constitutional Court deems necessary 
it boldly draws inspiration from these principles in order to support its reasoning. 
László Blutman points out that it would be counterproductive if the judgements of the 
Court could serve as exclusive arguments and in his opinion this would even be incompatible 
with our legal order. Blutman stresses that Strasbourg case law is complementary in nature, 
however, the supporting effects of these judgements are undeniable.50 The decisions of the 
European Court of Justice may shield the argumentation of the Constitutional Court in cases 
where the text of the Constitution does not provide suffi cient hold.51 For instance, in a 
case52 regarding the constitutionality of restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural lands, 
the forum referred to the Marckx case adopted on 13 June 1976 and to an unpublished 
opinion of the European Commission of Human Rights. In its judgement the European 
Court of Justice declared that the right to property is not extended to the acquisition of 
property as only already acquired property enjoys this type of legal protection.53
46 See Point f) of Section 2 of Article 24 of the Fundamental Law.
47 According to Article 42 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, if the Constitutional 
Court “declares that a legal act is contrary to an international treaty which, according to the 
Fundamental Law, shall not be in confl ict with the act promulgating the international treaty”, then the 
Constitutional Court is entitled to annul the contravening act. Nevertheless, if the Constitutional Court 
declares that such a legal act is contrary to an international treaty, with which, according to the 
Fundamental Law, the legal act promulgating the international treaty shall not be in confl ict, it shall 
request the Government or the legislator to commence the necessary measures in order to resolve the 
confl ict. 
48 According to Section 2 of Article 32 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court “[t]he 
proceedings may be requested by one quarter of Members of Parliament, the Government, the 
President of the Curia, the Prosecutor General or the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights”.
49 Tamás Molnár, ‘Az európai jogfejlődés hatása a magyar alkotmányfejlődésre’ [Effect of the 
European Legal Development on the Hungarian Constitutional Development] (2005) 16/2 Acta 
Humana 58.
50 Blutman (2009) 308.
51 Molnár 62.
52 Constitutional Decision No. 35/1994 (VI. 24.) AJBH 1994, p. 197.
53 Sólyom (1996) 154; Molnár (n 49) 61.
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We can say the following about the attitude of the Constitutional Court towards the 
Strasbourg case law: 
a.) First, the Constitutional Court does not intend to make it unambiguous that it 
applies the case law of the Court, not even in situations when this may be inferred from 
other circumstances.54 For instance, in the Bukta case55 the Constitutional Court utilises the 
logic of the Court in the domestic procedure regarding the annulment of the act concerned 
by merely mentioning the Court as one of the sources of the legal arguments presented. 
b.) Second, besides the Convention the Constitutional Court also interprets the 
complementary Protocols and in certain cases it even expands beyond the concept the 
Strasbourg Court would attribute to the provision concerned, as it happened in the case of 
the decision regarding religious freedom and the state’s obligation of establishing and 
maintaining public institutions.56
c.) Third, although the Constitutional Court is infl uenced by the basic principles 
developed by the Court, the Constitutional Court may not necessarily pay attention to the 
distinctions elaborated in each and every specifi c Strasbourg case or the further refi nement 
of such principles. In some cases the Constitutional Court refers to particular cases as the 
main authority in a given fi eld, notwithstanding the fact that scholarly literature would point 
to other judgments in the case concerned.
d.) Fourth, besides the text of the Convention and the respective case law, the 
Constitutional Court also takes into consideration, where appropriate, the recommendations 
of the Council of Europe in order to unfold the contents of certain fundamental rights.57
The main achievement of the Constitutional Court in relation to the Strasbourg law is 
that it supplemented our Fundamental Law – previously our Constitution – on the basis of 
the values enshrined in the Convention and further developed through Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, rendering these sources a benchmark in the protection of fundamental rights. 
One of the most important domestic judgements in this respect is perhaps the recognition of 
the freedom to conclude a marriage as a constitutional right with reference to the 
Convention.58 The recognition of this right is a novelty, especially if we consider that our 
previous constitution protected the institution of marriage and family59 but it did not set 
forth the conclusion of marriages as a fundamental right.
54 Szalai 14.
55 ECtHR: Bukta and others v. Hungary (Application no. 25691/04) Strasbourg, Judgment of 17 
July 2007. 51 EHHR 25.
56 By referring to Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court laid down 
in its Decision No. 4/1993 (II. 12.) (ABH 1993, p. 54.) that the positive duties of the state to ensure 
the freedom of religion go beyond the obligations stipulated by Act IV of 1990 on the Freedom of 
Conscience and Religion. Hungary undertook further obligations under international conventions, 
thus, beyond its duty to provide neutral education it must also ensure the legal and material conditions 
necessary for the establishment of religious schools. See Molnár 62.
57 See e.g. Constitutional Decision No. 41/2005 (X.27.) (autonomy of higher education 
institutions) ABH 2005, 459, Péter Kovács (concurring opinion).
58 The right to conclude a marriage pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention was deducted by 
the Constitutional Court on the basis of Article 7 paragraph 1 of the former Constitution which set out 
the consistency requirement between international law and domestic law in order to provide for the 
freedom to conclude a marriage. Constitutional Court Decision No. 22/1992 (IV. 10.) ABH 1993, 54.
59  See Article L of the Fundamental Law (previously Article 15 of Act XX of 1949 on the 
Constitution of the Hungarian Republic). 
70 MARCEL SZABÓ
In conclusion we may say that as a result of the Constitutional Court’s efforts, the 
Strasbourg case law has become a complementary means of substantiating, clarifying and 
determining the content of constitutional rights. However, the highest judicial forum does 
not refer typically to the possibility of confl ict of international and domestic norms but 
applies the Strasbourg case law as a benchmark for the interpretation of fundamental rights 
instead.60
4. SUMMARY
The Convention is the most important constitutional document in Europe. International 
treaties, including the Convention and the related case law of the Court occupy a favourable 
position in the Hungarian hierarchy of norms. However, the ideal status of the Convention 
would be if it were on equal footing with Hungarian constitutional provisions. Pursuant to 
our current legal system and to the practice of the Constitutional Court, the Convention 
ranks below the Constitution but above other sources of domestic law. Although the status 
of the Convention in the hierarchy of norms in Western states is similar to that in the 
Hungarian approach, a shift in this constitutional approach would nevertheless be desirable. 
It is worth noting that the Dutch Constitution61 provides constitutional rank to the 
Convention, moreover, the Austrian Fundamental Law62 explicitly makes the Convention 
part of constitution. The Constitution of Kosovo63 goes even further by declaring the 
requirement of consistency of the Constitution with Strasbourg case law.64
The standards set by the Court have become part of the civil attitude and the civilian 
way of thinking in many cases. Suffi ce to refer to a principle developed by the Court 
according to which public fi gures must tolerate more than other citizens in the context of 
others’ exercise of their freedom of expression; today, this principle is no longer a legal 
benchmark but has become part of the everyday attitude of Hungarian citizens.65 
As an outcome of the unique path of Central and Eastern European legal development, 
the provisions of the Convention and case law of the Court are not necessarily implemented 
into domestic law through the judicial practise of domestic judges, but it is much rather the 
Constitutional Court who facilitated such implementation. The clarifi cation of fundamental 
rights by the Constitutional Court and the work of Hungarian governmental representatives 
in Strasbourg helped fuel this procedure. Generally speaking it may be said that, albeit as a 
result of various efforts, in the course of the last 20 years the Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
become an integral part of Hungarian law. This gives rise to the hope that the means of 
legal enforcement and the conscious commitment to the Convention and the related case 
law of the Court will gain even more impetus in Hungary in the future. 
60 As László Blutman observes, the doctrine of constitutional interpretation in accordance with 
the generally accepted rules of international law has been developed in the practice of the 
Constitutional Court. Blutman (2009) 310.
61 Peter Van Dijk et al. (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (4th edn, Intersentia 2006) 27.
62 Art. II. 7 of Bundesverfassungsgesetz (BGBl. 59/1964).
63 Article 53 of the Constitution of Kosovo.
64 Sonnevend 166–167.
65 Tallódi 57.
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